

Magda Arnold and Max Scheler: From Kant to Emotion and the Other Way of Rationality

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Abstract

This article will address the recovery of emotion as a constitutive factor of human flourishing and of ethical meaning and lived experience. The paper will provide a sustained reflection on their critiques of the Kantian understanding of person. It will analyze their respective departures from the Kantian project and how their positions converge and diverge within the broader view of the phenomenological framework. Scheler's critique of Kantian formalism as depersonalizing the moral agent and reducing the irreducible and robust phenomenon of the human person, will be compared with Arnold's richly layered understanding of emotion in relation to its preceding, and primal grounding *appraisal* of any situation. This raised priority of emotion from its prevailing and insufficient view as secondary and reactionary, will be drawn out as a recovery of a more robust understanding of the human person in view of the meaning of community.

Keywords: Personalism, Thomistic anthropology, Appraisal theory, Value essence.

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1 ARNOLD: SETTING THE STAGE

The only approach that promises a solution to the problem of how perception arouses emotion is a careful phenomenological analysis of the whole sequence from perception to emotion and action.¹

¹M. B. ARNOLD, *Emotion and Personality*. Vol. 1: *Psychological Aspects*, Columbia University Press, New York 1960, p. 170.

Magda Arnold advanced a nuanced cognitive emotion theory responding to and moving past behaviorist reductionisms. By grounding emotions in cognitive appraisals—evaluations of objects as good or bad for oneself—she refines earlier models that deform emotional meaning by focusing only on raw desires and motivational states. Arnold aimed not only to clarify and enrich the layered emotional experiences but give anthropological situatedness to emotional action, expression, evolutionary origins, and neurophysiology. She accomplishes this cohesion through the intentionality tradition of Franz Brentano while calling to mind Max Scheler through her sustained emphasis on emotions as object-directed and cognitively based. Emotions are always object-directed, this is their unveiled intelligibility; to have an emotion, it is necessary to perceive or know the object at hand. For an emotion to be elicited, the object “must be appraised as affecting me in some way, affecting me personally as an individual with my particular experience and my particular aims.”² Our emotions presuppose both factual beliefs about an object and evaluative (appraisal) beliefs, as distinct cognitive processes. Arnold also places into essential dialogue the phenomenological approach with evolutionary psychology. While emotions possess biologically based evolutionary action impulses, emotion elicitation always involves appraisal, including “intuitive appraisal” and “reflective appraisal” as the cognitive determinant of emotion. For Arnold, appraisals commence the emotion process, initiating physiological, expressive, behavioral, and other changes that comprise the resulting and layered emotional state. Her work invaluablely recovers the complexity of capturing emotional phenomena within the cognitive framework of embodied beings.³

2 MAGDA ARNOLD AND IMMANUEL KANT

Arnold’s thought implicitly critiques Immanuel Kant’s understanding of the human person. Her phenomenologically engaged Thomistic personalism, which emphasizes the psychophysical unity of the person, challenges Kant’s perceived dualism and rationalism.⁴ Arnold opposed the sharp dualistic split between mind

²*Ibidem*, p. 171.

³Cf. *ibidem*, p. 91: “[Why is it] that some experiences have that particular quality we call ‘emotional’? Seeing a bear in the zoo arouses nothing but interest and curiosity—but seeing the same animal outside the zoo may arouse violent fear. What is the psychological process that turns a perception into an emotional experience?”

⁴Cf. A. WELLEK, *Emotional Polarity in Personality Structure*, in *Feelings and Emotions: The Loyola Symposium*, ed. by M. B. Arnold, Academic Press, New York 1970, p. 285: “Genuine pathos in the best sense is not appreciated by those whose emotions are sterile or poorly developed. Their thin emotionality cannot stand the two-dimensional expansion toward intensity as well as depth. At best, when stimulated by a concrete situation, their emotions precipitate a momentary explosion which is intense enough but lacks all depth. On the other hand, such people are easily taken in by

and body and advocated for the psychophysical unity of the person, where physiological responses and conscious thought are integrated. In her Thomistic and phenomenologically informed view, the human person is a single entity where biological, neurological, and spiritual dimensions are intrinsically linked, rather than separate realms of “nature” and “freedom.” Her core disagreements with the Kantian framework include:

1) *Kant’s Failure to Integrate Emotion and Reason:* Kant viewed emotions or “inclinations” as potentially disruptive to moral reason and the “categorical imperative.” Arnold countered this prevailing attitude⁵ by arguing that emotions are not merely obstacles but essential “action-tendencies” that provide the necessary impulse for human action.

2) *Kant’s Rationalism Ignores Emotions as Cognitive Appraisals:* While Kantian Pure Reason emphasized universal commandments of reason, Arnold proposed that human motivation begins with appraisal—a direct, intuitive, and often sensory judgment of whether something is “good-for-me” or “bad-for-me.” She argued that this intuitive level of cognition *precedes* and *informs* reflective judgment, making it a critical part of human nature that Kant’s rationalism largely neglects. Arnold argues against emotions as irrational “inclinations,” describing them instead as “felt tendencies.” They are not obstacles to rationality, but essential for a person to navigate the world and achieve genuine selfhood.

3) *The Potential Harm of Kantian Duty and Obligation:* Arnold’s understanding naturally challenges the Kantian sense of “duty” and “obligation” as potentially harmful if they are not integrated into a broader philosophy of psychology. She proposed the self-ideal—a positive, integrated vision of who a person “ought to be”—as the primary factor for personality integration and moral growth, rather

false pathos, which offers them the illusion of strong emotions without exacting payment in the form of a profound experience of which they are incapable.”

⁵Cf. J. HILLMAN, *C.G. Jung’s Contributions to ‘Feelings and Emotions’: Synopsis and Implications*, in *Feelings and Emotions: The Loyola Symposium*, cit., p. 125: “From the time of the Enlightenment in Germany (eighteenth-century writers such as Moses Mendelssohn, J. N. Tetens, and Kant) the soul was divided into three parts: thinking, willing, and feeling; the cognitive, conative, and affective faculties. Into the affective faculty was thrown everything that did not fit into thinking or willing. Thus it embraced desires, drives, and impulses as well as intuitions, instincts, moods, sensations, and of course, feelings, emotions, affects, and passions. Different psychologists at different times would rescue this or that piece of the affective faculty, such as sensation or impulse, and incorporate it into their system of thinking or willing. But fundamentally, this third region of the psyche, like Plato’s third class of men, was inferior; the model on which it was conceived echoed the ancient trinitarian division of the soul, the lowest aspect of which was associated with what was below the diaphragm, especially the liver. Furthermore, this bag of feelings was always in opposition to thinking, or, as Moses Mendelssohn said at the beginning of the modern tripartite division, ‘We no longer feel as soon as we think.’”

than mere adherence to abstract rules that would create what C.S. Lewis describes “men without chests.”⁶

4) *Criticism of the Kantian Limits of Pure Reason:* Contrary to the Kantian focus on the limits of pure reason, Arnold argued that human nature qualitatively refers to a transcendent reality, God, as the goal of human existence. She maintained that the human person’s capacity for self-knowledge and freedom can be properly understood *only* in relation to this ultimate end. Kant’s hyper-focus on autonomous reason excludes both integrative emotions and transcendent relationality.

3 MAX SCHELER AND MAGDA ARNOLD: COMPANIONS ON THE OTHER WAY OF RATIONALITY

Scheler critiqued Kant’s understanding of the human person by challenging his “cold”rationalism and Kant’s exclusion of emotions and individual uniqueness from the core of personhood. Both Arnold and Scheler sought to move beyond Kant’s formal, abstract “ego” toward a more “personalist” view.⁷ For Scheler, the Kantian “ego” ignores the essential irreducible individuality of each person. As he remarks *On The Eternal in Man*, “The infinite worth of the individual soul [is] the magna Charta of Europe.”⁸ Scheler and Arnold’s recovery of embodied emotions as the *other way of rationality* possess three key features:

1) *The Person is a Unity of Acts:* For both Scheler and Arnold, a person is not a static substance or a rational machine, but a dynamic unity of acts—including acts of loving, valuing, and sensing—that cannot be reductively categorized. This develops the Christian idea of community which Kant’s logical subject could hardly encounter. The person is a unity of acts and through those acts community becomes an essential, original aspect of human nature, bridging individual responsibility with collective solidarity before God. Their anthropologies challenge modern individualism and contractual theories of society, proposing instead interconnected moral responsibility. Community is inherent to human nature, not accidental, nor is it contractual:

It is inherent in the eternal, ideal nature of an intelligent person that all its existence and activity as a spirit is ... just as much an outward-conscious, co-responsible, communal reality as a self-conscious, self-responsible, individual reality.⁹

⁶C. S. LEWIS, *The Abolition of Man*, Harper, New York 2001, pp. 25-26.

⁷For a direct rebuttal to Kantian ethics, see Scheler’s material personalism in M. SCHELER, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston (IL) 1973.

⁸IDEM, *On the Eternal in Man*, Archon Books, Hamden (CT) 1972, p. 383.

⁹IDEM, *Formalism in Ethics*, cit., p. 373.

For Scheler, for example, person as the unity of acts is umbilically connected to his principle of moral reciprocity. This means individuals share collective guilt and merit. Each person is responsible to God, and we are responsible for everything of moral weight in the character and proceedings of the larger collective selves of which each of us is an integral part.¹⁰

One should also be sure of this: repentance is not only a process in the individual soul; like guilt it is basically also a social, historical, collective phenomenon. The great principle of the solidarity of all the children of Adam in responsibility, guilt, and merit implies the subsistence of collective responsibility, together with each individual's awareness that he does in fact share responsibility for all the events of the moral cosmos, has no primary connection with those perceptible, demonstrable effects which individuals exercise with one another whether directly or through whatever middle-terms, in the causal context of society and history, and which are accessible to their understanding. On the contrary, these effects, and our awareness of them, serve only to locate those points of the moral cosmos for which we can know with certainty our collective responsibility.¹¹

As a social being, the human person experiences himself as an inseparable participant in the "ethical cosmos through the sense of solidary co-responsibility with other persons ... however, he never loses the consciousness of his autonomy, the consciousness of his own positive or negative value, and self-responsibility."¹² But even Scheler's understanding of the "absolute intimate person" framing the deepest level of human individuality is never stripped from the Church. He describes a state of total, solitary interiority untouched by social roles. It transcends everyday social connections, placing the person in complete solitude with their lived experiences. However, the individual's solitary communion with God is never separated from the "collective person" of the Church. Intimacy with God inherently requires a deeper solidarity and inward participation within the broader communal body of the Church:

Scheler remarks here that this relation to God never takes place without the indirect solidarity with the collective person of the Church: in his "society with God," the person must become in a sense more "inside" the Church.¹³

2) *The human person's life is more intimately organized by Ordo Amoris or intuitive appraisals not by abstract imperatives:* Both Scheler and Arnold rejected Kant's idea that morality is based on a universal, duty-driven "categorical imperative."

¹⁰IDEM, *Ordo Amoris*, in *Selected Philosophical Essays*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston (IL) 1973, pp. 98-135.

¹¹IDEM, *Person and Value: Three Essays*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1987, p. 115.

¹²K. WOJTYLA, *Lublin Lectures and Works on Max Scheler*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 2017, p. 488.

¹³*Ibidem*.

A person's moral life is guided by an order of love and felt-experiences through which they intuitively perceive a hierarchy of objective values. This is crucial given Scheler's critique of the moral bankruptcy of Christianity in Europe. He deeply acknowledges widespread perceptions that Christianity has failed to prevent the horrors of war: "Europe calls itself Christian ... And one of the results of almost two thousand years of Christian education is a wholesale atrocity the like of which the world had never seen."¹⁴ The radical depth of emotional meaning can be seen in Scheler's understanding of "Love your enemies, do good to them which hate you, bless them that curse you." In *Ressentiment*, Scheler states that these precepts "are born from the Gospel's profound spirit of individualism, which refuses to let one's own actions and conduct depend in any way on somebody else's acts. The Christian refuses to let his acts be mere reactions—such conduct would lower him to the level of his enemy."¹⁵ Arnold profoundly reaffirms this reality:

My scale [of being] obviously implied an acting, not merely reacting, individual. I had never had much use for stimulus response theories and their machine-models of the human being. It had also become clear to me that all vital activities must have a source within the individual. That source might be life. But life could only be a source of organic activities; and where is the source of behavior and conduct? I came back again and again to the soul as the source of activity but did not know how to go on from there.¹⁶

3) *The value of emotional perception or special acts of feeling as primary access points to value:* Scheler and Arnold criticize treating all emotions as mere "sensible" inclinations that distract from duty. Both argue that special acts of "feeling" are the primary way human beings access moral truths and values. As Scheler remarks, "genuine lived philosophy is a love-determined movement of the inmost personal self of a finite being toward participation in the essential reality of all possibles."¹⁷ For Arnold, the human person's transcendent anthropology has been obscured and marginalized in modernity. Christian love has been supplanted by humanitarianism, which is critiqued as a leveling, secular passion devoid of spiritual hierarchy. Arnold remarks:

In general, the more a human relationship is based on sensory appeal or appeal to isolated tendencies, the more ambivalent will it be. Only when it is based upon a common striving toward a common goal which is in harmony with man's final end, to which all other aspects of that relationship are subordinated, will there be love properly so called [...] Only on that level will it be love of a person rather than love

¹⁴M. SCHELER, *On the Eternal in Man*, cit., p. 361.

¹⁵IDEM, *Ressentiment*, The Free Press, New York (NY) 1960, p. 100.

¹⁶M. B. ARNOLD, *Magda Arnold Autobiography*, unpublished manuscript, Tucson (AZ) n.d.

¹⁷M. SCHELER, *On the Eternal in Man*, cit., p. 74.

of his physical or intellectual attractions. On that level, love becomes a sharing of the Good.¹⁸

4 THE LIMITATIONS OF MAX SCHELER'S VALUE-ESSENCE IN BRIEF

The entire living, practical tradition of the Church attests that this ethical principle of imitating a personal model (through the mediation of the direct model—the model of the first Master) belongs to the very essence of Christian ethics. Scheler placed precisely this principle in the foreground of his personalistic system. It may seem that, because of this, he positioned himself as close to the essential content of Christian ethics as no other person ... Thus, we must ascertain all the more to what extent the entire ethical system of the phenomenologist from Cologne is susceptible to receiving the ethical content of Revelation.¹⁹

Scheler is deeply critical of Kant's deontological ethics and yet not critical of the loss of the anthropology and metaphysics which issued such ethics. Scheler recognized that Kant's person was impersonal, wholly reducible to the autonomy of the will which needs to shirk a material ethics of values to be free. But does the Kantian problem become Scheler's own problem due to his restrictive phenomenological approach to value-essence? Scheler lays out what looks to be a supporting foundation for a Christian ethics with the centrality of the person, but Scheler cannot unite the person with the one true irreducible, transcendent end, Christ. Scheler sets up the uniqueness of the person but does not get to the source, Christ, who elevates that uniqueness into something more than mere general imitation of a type or copy theory. For Scheler, we *must* see Christ in others, in children, model persons, leaders. A truly exemplary person is connected to his or her own unique value-essence. We seek in imitation to connect to our own value-essence and in doing so illuminate our union with Christ. But Scheler has Christ as model person more original than the norms but nothing ontologically, anthropological, and theologically grounded separates Christ from all other great/model persons.²⁰ He makes the phenomenological experience of God identical with God,

¹⁸M. B. ARNOLD, *Feelings and Emotions as Dynamic Factors in Personality Integration*, in *The Human Person: An Approach to an Integral Theory of Personality*, ed. by M. B. Arnold, J. A. Gasson, The Ronald Press Company, New York (NY) 1954, p. 300.

¹⁹K. WOJTYŁA, *The Lublin Lectures*, cit., p. 505.

²⁰Cf. SCHELER, *Formalism*, cit., p. 222, n. 50: "But moral effectiveness from person to person, infinitely superior to all these kinds of effectiveness, consists in the fact that the pure and immediate vision of the pure value and pure being of the person invites free 'following.' There is only one ideal content of the ought (there is no normative ought) that helps us to bring the phenomenon of Jesus to the fore: he himself." See also *ibidem*, p. 574: "Model persons essentially are, from a genetic point of view, also more original than norms." The experienced relation that a person has with regard to the content of the personality of his model is following, based on love ... Nothing on earth allows a person to become good so originally and immediately and necessarily as the evidential and adequate intuition of a good person in his goodness. This relation is absolutely superior to any

thus collapsing the distinction between the natural and the supernatural.²¹ This reduction is particularly apparent in how Scheler grounds the experience of the divine in human emotion, reducing and constraining God to an experience of human love and consciousness, inevitably closing the infinite chasm between the Creator and the creature.²² Because for Scheler, the religious act is primarily an act of the heart—an immediate, intuitive experience of love that precedes traditional conceptual knowledge or rational evidence, he vitiates a true and rigorous metaphysics of Being. By grounding God in emotional intuition, he places the human person and God on the same continuum of consciousness. While this may be a lengthy continuum, with Christ emphasized as *the* model person, nevertheless the loss of metaphysical ground and its replacement with consciousness makes God subject to the limits of human feeling rather than an objective, transcendent reality.

The crucial issue at hand is the finality of human acts which properly expressed reflects both the uniqueness of Christ as unlike any other model person and distinguishes the natural from the supernatural. If human action is fundamentally theocentric—done explicitly for the sake of God, and with a view toward supernatural rewards and eternal consequences—this *telos* cannot be realized in its mature otherness in Scheler’s personalism. For him, the ultimate good is the value itself as an object to be directly realized for its own sake, rather than a means to achieve a separate, irreducible, and higher good of God as the ultimate and holy. Scheler’s framework is, again, heavily based on emotional intuition,²³ it

other relation that might be considered the reason for becoming good.”

²¹*Ibidem*, p. 525: “And so the relation between the collective person and the individual person does not represent a special kind of relation between the universal and the individual; the collective person (apart from the concepts of it, such as state, nation, church) is as much a spiritual individual as the individual person, e.g., the Prussian state. From an ethical point of view there is for us no relation of subordination between the individual person and the collective person. Rather, both have a common ethical subordination to the idea of an infinite person in whom the division between individual persons and collective persons, necessary for finite persons, ceases to be. Therefore the Godhead, according to its very idea, cannot be conceived either as an individual person (which would be henotheism, and not monotheism) or as the highest collective person (pantheism). It can be conceived only as the (‘singular,’ not numerically ‘one’) infinite person.” The ethical and eschatological content of the Gospel demands an irreducibly different view of the finality of human acts than we find in Scheler. According to Scheler, the very value given in the direct cognitive feeling is an end (object) to be realized. In his view, value cannot be the object of realization for the sake of some *other* good or some other value. If, for Scheler, values are absolute, to pursue them for the sake of God would mean one pursues them improperly or instrumentally. I contend that Scheler’s pursuit of pure value as ultimate strips acts of their true, unifying finality, Christ.

²²Cf. S. GOTTLÖBER, *Intuiting the Divine? Erich Przywara’s Critique of Scheler’s Phenomenology of Religion*, «Max Scheler in Dialogue, Contributions to Phenomenology», 118 (2022), pp. 133–59.

²³K. WOJTYŁA, *Lublin Lectures*, cit., p. 12: “One cannot realize the good or evil itself; one can only experience it emotionally: one can only feel it. When, however, one would like to realize the ‘good,’ to strive for it as an end, then—according to Scheler—such a striving would bear the mark

falls short of encompassing the radical and personal alterity that must motivate and define the Christian *eschaton*. Because Christ is not merely a figure in history, but “the incarnate meaning of history, the *Logos*, the self-manifestation of truth itself,”²⁴ he is metaphysically and anthropologically irreducible to the hierarchical scale and pattern of model persons that defines Scheler’s value system. To be in the image of Christ is, for the Christian, to recognize its impossibility and necessity. The metaphysical straining to embody and transmit the Image of Christ is *how* the faith is transmitted. There is a supreme and essential incommunicability in the second Person of the Trinity. This un-transmitted reality is not opposed to the work of evangelization but essential to it. No one can imitate Christ. Fyodor Dostoevsky dipped into madness writing *The Idiot* and Prince Myshkin, who, for all his sanctity, falls short. This is the pattern throughout the centuries: a failure to embody, model, and transmit the Word. The Church calls us to put to life a truly good person, one in whom the radical perfections of Christ are not massaged away but communicated in their transcendent urgency. Christ is the unrepeatable and untranslatable ever-presence of Truth which we cannot utter, for only the Word can utter himself. But the Word also necessitates that we communicate it and evangelize. This requirement places the authentic person in an ontological rupture; a stretching of his being by way of divine abandonment. We are unsure how to communicate the Image and Word which is irreducible to all images and models. More still, our temptation to manage the Word politically may create pernicious all-too-worldly substitutes because the Word is in but not of the world. Christ is perpetually overcoming the world, elevating Time into Being, History into Event. Christ is not only the Event of history but the unrepeatable Image that cannot be organized politically into a pattern, or reduced to a species of generality, one of the many “isms.”²⁵ The God-Man is the un-

of a certain Pharisaism. In order to explain this quite unexpected turn of the problem, we ought to become thoroughly aware of the consequences of Schelerian emotionalism. Values are not first and foremost experienced by the will, volition, or striving, but, above all, by emotion. In this sphere emotion holds primacy. In this light, things must be arranged in the following way: to will the value ‘good’ means to will to emotionally experience, to will to feel one’s own ethical goodness. Scheler is aware that this cannot be the end of volition. He does not even think about which feeling would accompany the willing of the ‘good.’ He is content to state that to will to feel one’s ethical goodness is something pharisaical.”

²⁴J. RATZINGER, *Christ, Faith, and the Challenges of Culture*, LEV, Vatican City (1993) § 3. Cf. IDEM, *Jesus of Nazareth: Holy Week*, Ignatius Press, San Francisco 2011, p. 272: “As something that breaks out of history and transcends it, the Resurrection nevertheless has its origin within history and up to a certain point still belongs there. Perhaps we could put it this way: Jesus’s Resurrection points beyond history but has left a footprint within history. Therefore it can be attested by witnesses as an event of an entirely new kind.”

²⁵K. WOJTYLA, *Lublin Lectures*, cit., p. 568: “According to Scheler’s system, man finds the very ideal in the personal model. The consequences of such a position are two: (1) Scheler’s system does not know the ideal of ethical perfection in the form of an abstract principle as we hear in the

patterned patterner refusing all reductive patterns, and His dependent Christian society must *per impossible* follow by way of analogy. The civilizational tension is always present right at the threshold of language and meaning: “unlikeness remains infinitely greater than likeness, yet not to the point of abolishing analogy and its language.”²⁶

The Christian society is both possible because necessary and yet impossible because unachievable, whether framed historically in terms of a state religion or a religious state. The problem goes to the very meanings of *polis*, of the human person, of Being, of God. There will always be a sense of the forsaken within the Christian *politeia*, of our inability to proceed, advance, or resolve. The human person, living to imitate the ineluctable divine Image, lives as a captive at odds with a world addicted to easily replicated mimetic patterns. As T.S. Eliot notes, “between the Church and the World there is no permanent *modus-vivendi* possible.”²⁷ What Scheler neglects in his value-based model person is the Christ-event as the enduring Image, the supreme patterner without replication in existence. Only if an uncreated Being can be felled by death is the impossible made possible. The world is not the Image, Christ is. Nature cannot supply us with the end; we are nomads in a nomadic world. Christ’s death—the death of the uncreated, incarnated and resurrected—opens this truth. He is the Image of impossibility-as-perfection, beyond idea yet incorporating all ideas, too beautiful not to be true. When we attempt to be in the image of Christ, we experience this metaphysical crucifixion, this ontological lancing, that relentlessly moves us in and beyond the world, in and beyond Scheler’s continuum of consciousness, moving us in and beyond our own capacity. The inability and necessity to transmit the Word are discoverable only in human nature resolved to find itself analogically within the supernatural. It is this resolution that protects the *polis* and its people from the demonic suppression of our finitude in favor of ideological progressivism.

Scheler does not escape the Kantian reduction. Like Kant but unlike Arnold’s anthropology, Scheler’s person is never ethically acting towards an ultimate end irreducibly beyond himself. He invokes solipsism of phenomenological value im-

teaching of Jesus Christ: ‘Be perfect,’ but knows only the ideal in a concrete form of the person-model. (2) At the same time, however, this person-model is not the object of imitation through his own real ethical perfection but through the ‘ideal’ value essence, that is, properly through the world of values that he himself experiences as his ethical task. Hence, the entire Schelerian conception of ‘imitation’ lacks, on the one hand, the ideal in the form found in Christian ethics and, on the other hand, the real perfection of the person as the model, that is, the direct object of imitation ... The imitation itself does not consist in forming the analogous real perfection in the person of the imitator; the love for the person of the master transforms merely the ‘ideal’ value essence of the disciple.”

²⁶BENEDICT XVI, *Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections*, LEV, Vatican City 2006, § 7.

²⁷T. S. ELIOT, *Christianity and Culture*, Harvest, London 1967, p. 72.

posed only from within consciousness. Whether what is invoked is Kant's dry call to duty or Scheler's impassioned mysticism of consciousnesses, both invoke ethics as an expression of consciousness and nothing more. Karol Wojtyła attends to this concern. He stresses that love necessitates an eschatological structure to reveal its plenitude and mystery, but this is precisely what is lacking in Scheler's phenomenological system. With Wojtyła, we see that in the teaching of revelation, all emphasis in the doctrine of eternal blessedness falls on the object of blessedness, namely, the divine nature, which is this object. In Scheler's Phenomenological system, of course, this doctrine cannot be grasped and expressed... No good that comes from outside the person can be a greater good than the good which the person finds in himself when he experiences himself as the source of a morally good act... The greatest happiness and the greatest suffering—man draws these from within himself, he himself is its source for himself. This point of view seems to separate us completely from the Christian teaching. Given such a point of view, can we establish any point of contact with the revealed truth according to which the object of man's final blessedness is divine nature. The Christian thinker should not forego the great advantages which the Phenomenological method offers his work. It impresses the stamp of experience on works of ethics and nourishes them with the life-knowledge of concrete man by allowing an investigation of moral life from the side of its appearance. Yet, in all this, the Phenomenological method plays only a secondary assisting role ... At the same time, these investigations convince us that the Christian thinker, especially the theologian, who makes use of phenomenological experience in his work, cannot be a Phenomenologist.²⁸

5 MAGDA ARNOLD'S THOMISTIC ADVANCE IN BRIEF

What Arnold accomplishes in her appraisal theory of emotion is what Scheler cannot. He neglects the anthropological underpinnings of a Thomistic metaphysics favoring a pure phenomenology of formalism that fails to reflect the *specificity* of the irreducible singular human person. In Thomistic anthropology, deftly utilized by Arnold, the human person is a composite of two substantially united co-principles: body and soul. Personhood, for Aquinas, functions on the paradoxical structure of the soul's incompleteness and completeness. The soul is an incomplete part absent the specific human body and yet if the soul were *only* an incomplete part it could not function as the substantial form of the body and thus as its guiding principle as consciousness. It is precisely this paradox that guides Arnold's *appraisal* theory and enables her to avoid the various reductions to materialism and behaviorism on one

²⁸K. WOJTYŁA, *Lublin Lectures*, cit., p. 196.

hand, or the failure to account for inscribed biological and psychological factors on the other.

Arnold heeds Aquinas and places the person in this dialogic tension, this crucial metaphysical mystery.²⁹ To emphasize that the soul is the substantial form of the body as its formal aspect casts a revaluation of the unity of the body and soul as to whether this relationship benefits the soul. As substantial form of the body, the soul must be a substance in its own right and thus be able in some respect to stand distinct, and without the need or aid of the body. On the other hand, because the soul's substance is to be the active or animating principle of the body, then structurally, the soul needs the body to find its own perfection and to be in the activity of its perfection. It is a danger to speak of the soul as "intellectual" in its separated status, and "taking on" the activities of sensible powers when united to the body. These expressions promote an ontological indifference as to the soul's status—that it could either be embodied and thus take on sensible activity, or be separate, unmixed, and intellectual. Still, as Arnold recognizes, there is that degree of self-presence to the human soul as substantial form which must be elucidated to avoid the trappings of a Cartesian mind, of an inauthentic separation of the relationship between the soul and body, split in its identity.³⁰ This twofold structure, in its adolescence in Aristotle, is startled to maturity in St. Thomas precisely because of *creatio ex nihilo*, where the compositeness of the human person speaks not only about the meaning of the human person but, through it, the human person announces and receives the meaning of the Creator God. This is why for Arnold there is no greater foundation for one's integral selfhood but God: "As an aid to the establishment of a worth-while self-ideal, and its single-minded pursuit under the most trying circumstances, this love of God has no equal."³¹ The soul as substance, in its very intellectuality, reflect this crucial compositeness.³² "No part has the completion of its nature when separated from the whole. Hence, since the soul is a part of human nature, it does not have

²⁹A. PEGIS, *At the Origins of the Thomistic Notion of Man*, Macmillan, New York (NY) 1963, pp. 38-39: "For the soul is not only substance and form but substance as form. It has the sort of being that both transcends matter and, in its very transcendence, needs it for the accomplishment of its work as a spiritual substance. If the soul is a substance, consequently on the ground of its self-subsistence, its incompleteness of nature means it is a substance as completing the human species as the form of the body."

³⁰THOMAS AQUINAS, *Disputed Questions on Truth*, Henry Regnery, Chicago (IL) 1952, q. 10, a. 8, ad 1: "Before the mind abstracts from phantasms, it has habitual knowledge of itself, by which it can perceive that it exists."

³¹M. B. ARNOLD, *Emotion and Personality*, vol. 1, cit., p. 327.

³²Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Commentary on the De Anima*, Yale University Press, New Haven (CT) 1951, lect. 10; IDEM, *Summa Theologica*, Cambridge University Press, New York 1967, I, q. 76, a. 5; A. PEGIS, *At the Origins of the Thomistic Notion of Man*, cit., p. 40: "We are invited by St. Thomas to think that in his very compositeness man is wholly intellectual but intellectual according to the mode of compositeness."

the completion of its nature except in union with the body.”³³ The recognition of the soul and body as co-parts is a testament to human nature as a movement toward completion.³⁴ It is therefore not split in its identity. The human person is thus a psychophysical unity. As Arnold aptly remarks,

[If] emotion is to be instrumental in self-actuation, the objects of emotion must be harmonized with the person’s larger goal as a human being. If these objects are seen in their real value, if they are seen in the proper perspective of man’s final end, then the judgment that they are suitable will be objective and well ordered.³⁵

The Thomistic accounting of the soul is responsible for the organization and overall health of the creature and governs that nature, and by extension human behavior, according to a hierarchy of powers: (a) the rational or cognitive, (b) the sensory, (c) the vegetal or natural.³⁶ This Thomistic structure, read through Arnold, shows how psychopathology would arise if one of the more basic powers takes priority over the higher ones—for example the appetitive overwhelms the intellectual—creating imbalance and harmful habits.³⁷ Arnold’s beautiful weaving of Thomistic anthropology and human psychology, promotes real transcendence and purpose. The *whole* human person is in the image and likeness of God uniting affectivity, and its activity, as participations in the human person’s unique self-presence and longer way.³⁸ This is why, for Arnold, emotion is a *doing*, it is part of our agency, not a passive product of our determinisms: “Emotion is not something that happens to us but something we do: we evaluate something as dangerous, and feel fear; as annoying, and feel anger. Although unintended and often unwanted, emotion is still something we have initiated. Hence, we are ac-

³³THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Spiritualibus Creaturis*, Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Rome 1927, 2, ad 5.

³⁴A. PEGIS, *At the Origins of the Thomistic Notion of Man*, cit., p. 56: “The slow maturing of man, his need to spend time being a man, is for St. Thomas no more than the outward and visible sign of a deeper and inward temporality. For thus to be a man is to be becoming one through a personal history.”

³⁵M. B. ARNOLD, *Feelings and Emotions as Dynamic Factors*, cit., p. 306.

³⁶Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa Theologica*, I-II, q. 26.

³⁷M. B. ARNOLD, *Perennial Problems in the Field of Emotion*, in *Feelings and Emotions: The Loyola Symposium*, cit., p. 177: “The diabetic may crave sweets yet refrain from giving in to his desire because he knows what the consequences of an indulgence will be. The smoker knows the dangers of smoking but hopes that he will be lucky and goes on smoking. In both cases, there is reflection, a weighing of alternatives, in which the intuitive appraisal leading to desire is either counterbalanced or reinforced by deliberate judgment. The final decision may not be the most attractive alternative nor is it always the most prudent choice.”

³⁸THOMAS AQUINAS, *Disputed Questions on Truth*, cit., q. 10, a. 8, ad 2: “The immediacy of the soul’s ownmost intuition of itself confirms that man is already in the image and likeness of God as unfailingly existent: no one has ever made the mistake of not perceiving that he was alive, a fact which belongs to the knowledge by which one knows in its singularity what goes on in his soul. It is according to this knowledge that the soul is said to be habitually known through its essence.”

tive in emotion, not passive. We are the actor, the agent.”³⁹ Let us close with an apt passage:

The “world and the flesh” have an attraction that is difficult to resist, yet is out of proportion to their genuine value for the human being ... It is here that religion corrects our values and draws our attention to an ideal that far surpasses what man can set up for himself. Revelation asserts that man has a destiny which goes beyond any of the goals he can reach in this world; that man’s desire for perfect knowledge, for unfailing love and understanding, for enduring happiness, can and will find its fulfilment in God who is all in all. This sets the goal of human life as union with God. Such an ideal will organize man’s actions and bring them into harmony.⁴⁰

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³⁹M. B. ARNOLD, *Magda Arnold Autobiography*, cit.

⁴⁰IDEM, *Psychology and the Image of Man*, «Religious Education», 54/1 (1959), p. 32.