The Incompatibility of a Thomistic View of Existence and Natural Existence Monism

Authors

  • Tim Mosteller California Baptist University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17421/2498-9746-03-19

Abstract

This paper considers the incompatibility of a broadly Thomistic view of the nature of existence with natural existence monism. The first part of this paper offers two lines of reasoning to establish that existence should be understood as essential exemplification. Two “Thomistic Routes” to this conclusion are considered. The first route is an ”exterior” route developed from ordinary sense perception. This route is elaborated by George Klubertanz and Jacques Maritain. The second route is developed by Edith Stein. I call this an “interior” route, which is based on self-awareness and rational reflection. The second part of this paper considers existence monism in light of the understanding of existence as essential exemplification developed in part one. I argue that natural existence monism is incompatible with an understanding of existence as essential exemplification.

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Published

2021-05-04

Issue

Section

Metaphysics, epistemology and science