The Other between Hell and Responsibility: Sartre and Lévinas Compared

Abstract

The relationship with the other has been a central theme in twentieth-century philosophy, spanning ontology, ethics and phenomenology. This contribution analyses the perspectives of Sartre and Lévinas, who, despite sharing a phenomenological basis, arrive at opposite conclusions. Sartre develops a pessimistic view: seeing the other as a threat that objectifies and limits freedom, in his theory, the self risks losing its authenticity under the gaze of the other. Lévinas, on the other hand, conceives otherness as an ethical appeal: the face of the other arouses responsibility, placing ethics above ontology. The relationship is asymmetrical, implying a unilateral commitment to justice and altruism. The comparison between these views raises questions about altruism and the meaning of empathy. While Sartre warns of the risks of reification, Lévinas proposes an ethic of recognition. Both perspectives offer crucial tools for understanding the meaning of empathy and ethical commitment to the other in contemporary society.