Moral Imagination in Light of Magda Arnod’s Appraisal Theory

Abstract

The growing interest in imagination and its relevance to moral education has led to the use of the term moral imagination. This multifaceted concept refers to the ability to represent possible futures and alternative scenarios, to develop empathy and moral sensitivity, and to guide ethical deliberation. However, contemporary literature lacks a clear articulation linking moral imagination to the theory of internal senses, particularly the cogitative sense, which is responsible for weighing up what is desirable in relation to the singular good.
This article explores the relationship between moral imagination and Magda B. Arnold’s appraisal theory, with the aim of demonstrating how her contributions regarding evaluative judgements can shed light on the contemporary notion of moral imagination.
Arnold argues that all emotions require an evaluation, a sensory judgement, of the situation based on what is perceived as valuable or harmful for the person. From this perspective, it is proposed that imagination cannot be separated from evaluation, as images must also be assessed in terms of their orientation towards the good. Understanding this evaluative dimension reveals the link between emotion and moral imagination, providing a framework for examining how they contribute to the self-ideal. Furthermore, an open question remains regarding the possible activation of emotions through the direct intervention of intellect and will, representing a promising avenue for future research that could further expand the explanatory scope of the evaluative model.