Virtue as a disposition to being affected. Aristotle on passions in NE II 4




emotions, virtue, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, anger, fear


In the NE Aristotle states that virtue is a state by dint of which we are well or badly off in relation to the emotions. The main aim of this paper is then to explore how virtue relates to emotions and the issues at stake in dealing with passions and hexeis. Firstly, because Aristotle describes emotions as ethically neutral, i.e. we do not blame or praise an agent because he or she feels anger or fear, we should ask why Aristotle states that agents can be blamed for feeling too much fear in given circumstances. Secondly, I aim to address the question of whether we can talk of an emotional education in Aristotle’s Ethics and how it can be possible to educate our emotions since they are not an object of choice.





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